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Polanyi’s Double Movement and the
Reconstruction of Critical Theory
Le double mouvement de Polanyi et la reconstruction de la théorie critique
Fred Block
 
Introduction
1 Karl  Polanyi  argued in The  Great  Transformation (2001 [1944])that the development of
market  societies  over  the  past  two  hundred  years  has  been  shaped  by  a  double
movement. On one side is the movement of laissez faire--the efforts by a variety of groups
to expand the scope and influence of self-regulating markets. On the other side has been
the movement of protection–the initiatives, again by a wide range of social actors, to
insulate the fabric of social life from the destructive impact of market pressures. What we
think of as market societies or “capitalism” is the product of both of these movements ; it
is an uneasy and fluid hybrid that reflects the shifting balance of power between these
contending forces.1
2 Many contemporary analysts have found this formulation useful to understand global
developments of the last thirty years (Berman 2006, Blyth 2002, Bugra and Agartan 2007,
Evans 2008, Silver and Arrighi 2003). Particularly since 1980, the movement of laissez-faire
has been in the ascendant in the form of “neo-liberalism”, “market fundamentalism” or
the “Washington consensus”. Yet at the same time, at multiple levels of politics–local,
national, regional, and global-- we also see counter movements that have sought to check,
control,  or  modify  the  impact  of  market  forces.  And,  in  fact,  there  is  considerable
evidence that business and finance “need” some of these limits,  especially regulatory
initiatives, to avoid destructive social, environmental, and economic consequences (Evans
2008).
3 But Polanyi’s double movement formulation has been criticized for being functionalist or
for reifying an abstract entity called “society” that somehow knows how and when to
protect itself (Block and Somers 1984). Rather than responding to these criticisms point
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by point,  this  essay will  attempt to develop a  theoretical  reconstruction of  Polanyi’s
double movement concept–showing the theoretical foundations on which it  rests and
arguing that this reconstructed theory of the double movement has the potential to be an
important element of a 21st century critical theory. This reconstruction does not claim to
be an accurate reflection of Karl Polanyi’s theoretical and political intentions when he
wrote The Great Transformation. On the contrary, the intention is to use some of Polanyi’s
ideas to create a theory that illuminates political possibilities immanent in the existing
social order.
4 The essay starts by laying out the broad outlines of the double movement idea, and then
it elaborates the micro-foundations of the protective counter movement to explain how
agents sometimes have the opportunity, the power, and the capacity to challenge and
change the institutional structures of market societies. After examining barriers to the
mobilization of a protective counter movement, the final section explores the possibilities
of moving beyond the double movement.
 
The theoretical project
5 In developing the concept of the double movement, Polanyi was addressing some key
problems in Marxist class analysis. For Polanyi, standard analyses of “class struggle” were
economistic ;  they  focused  too  narrowly  on  the  relative  strength  of  workers  and
employers at the point of production rather than analyzing the larger political field in
which  those  conflicts  occurred  (Block  and  Somers  1984). Polanyi  suggests  that  the
exercise of state power fundamentally shapes the relative strength of different social
actors,  so  he  broadened  his  analytic  lens  to  encompass  battles  over  government
regulation, over the provision of public goods and services, and over international flows
of labor, goods, and money. It is implicit in his analysis that these conflicts ultimately
influence the balance of forces on the shop floor. 
6 For Polanyi, this analytic shift follows logically from his understanding that the market
system did not and could not exist independently of government action. Even when the
official  ideology  is  laissez-faire, the  state  is  deeply  involved  in  managing  market
economies. This is what he meant by his dictum that “Laissez-faire was planned,” and he
developed the point with his account of the fictitious commodities of land, labor, and
money. Since  the  market  acting  alone  cannot  produce  these  things  in  correct  and
sustainable quantities, the state must manage the supply and demand for these critical
inputs to the production process (Block 2003). 
7 This fictitious foundation of the market economy meant that the movement for laissez-
faire always operates at a certain disadvantage. Since its stated political goal–a fully self-
regulating market economy–is fundamentally impractical and incoherent, there is always
a substantial gap between the ideology and the reality. This represents a major difference
between Marx and Polanyi. For  the  former,  the  core  contradiction is  that  capitalism
would  prove  unable  to  further  develop  the  productive  forces  and  a  socialist
transformation would become inevitable. For Polanyi, the core contradiction of market
society is that a system of self-regulating markets cannot possibly be a foundation for
social order ; state action is required to produce and maintain economic and social order.
So despite the power imbalance between employers and workers, the opponents of self-
regulating  markets  can  use  this  impossibility  to  win  incremental  changes  that  help
protect society from the market. 
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8 Polanyi’s analysis develops two key innovations ; it reconceptualizes the field in which
social struggles take place and it provides a less class-deterministic account of who the
relevant actors in these struggles are. These two moves are closely interconnected since
Polanyi sought a more holistic account of social conflicts in which the specific historical
context helped shape how social groups mobilized (Block and Somers 1984). 
9 Perhaps, Polanyi’s most original contribution was to redefine the field of social struggle
as occurring in a specifically global context. To be sure, many analysts before him had
recognized the expansive and global nature of capitalism, but he took the argument a
step further by showing how social struggles within particular polities were constrained
and limited by the nation’s particular position within the global system of states. This
meant  that  the  two  movements  were  not  simply  national  phenomena,  but  global
phenomena. For most of the past two centuries, the influence of the movement for laissez-
faire was magnified enormously by the support of the world’s dominant global power,
first  England  and  then  the  United  States,  and  the  system  of  financial  and  military
coercion that those powers were able to mobilize (This part of Polanyi’s analysis has been
effectively elaborated by Arrighi 2007 and Arrighi and Silver 1999). 
10 For  Polanyi,  it  is  a  given  that  markets  can  function  in  societies  in  many  different
ways. However, both England and the United States exported to the rest of the world one
particular template --an economy organized around an integrated set of self-regulating
markets for land, labor, capital, and other commodities. To be sure, even in England and
the United States, the actual organization of the economy followed this template only
loosely, but political and economic leaders around the world were well-advised to say
that they were implementing this template or they could be subject to harsh reprisals by
the dominant power. In the 19th century, compliance was expressed by embracing “free
trade” and the gold standard ; in the 20th century by aligning against the socialist or
communist templates (Block 1977, Silver and Arrighi 2003). 
11 The coercive power of England and the United States has never been absolute ;  given
limited  resources,  they  were  both  forced  to  exercise  influence  pragmatically  and
selectively. Some nations were granted substantially more leeway to violate the template
either  because  of  their  geopolitical  location  or  their  specific  struggles  against  the
protective  counter  movement. Moreover,  there  have  also  been  periods  when  the
dominant power has been preoccupied with hot or cold wars that have left other nations
with considerably more room to maneuver. And in the 1930’s, when the global economy
collapsed,  neither the declining power–England–or the rising power–the U.S.–had the
resources or inclination to enforce the discredited global rules of the game.
12 Nevertheless, the general pattern has been that social conflicts within nations have been
conditioned by this global context. The movement for laissez-faire within nations has been
strengthened by invoking the authority of the global hegemon ; the social groups that
amass behind the banner of laissez-faire have been able to claim that their nation would
become an isolated backwater if  it  failed to expand the scope of  markets.  And these
groups have resisted demands for social  protection by claiming that  such moves are
simply not possible without a radical and dangerous break with the international rules. 
13 But this dependence of the forces of laissez-faire on the global hegemon is also a source of
weakness because of the inevitable rivalries within the international state system. Since
Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Manufacturing in 1791, the suspicion has existed that the
template being exported by the hegemon is not in the general interest but is designed
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primarily to preserve its position at the top of the global system at the expense of other
nations  (Chang  2002  and  2008).  Domestic  counter  movements  are  able  to  draw  on
nationalist resentments in arguing against fealty to foreign notions of how the economy
should properly operate and in favor of pursuing their own unique developmental path
that requires some greater degree of political management of markets.
14 This is the complex terrain that political  leaders within nations have to negotiate. In
order to hold on to political power, they need to protect the nation’s position within the
international  state  system  and  they  need  to  make  the  domestic  economy  function
effectively. Tilting policies too far in the direction favored by the movement of laissez-
faire risks both weakening the domestic economy and becoming too dependent on the
global  hegemon.  But  tilting  too  far  in  the  other  direction  can  anger  the  business
community and lead to disinvesment that could jeopardize efforts to improve the nation’s
global position. Political leaders have to thread the needle between these two dangers
and this provides opportunities and openings for both movements.
15 In seeking to capitalize on these opportunities, the two competing movements struggle to
influence the state in their own preferred direction,  but their relative power will  be
heavily  dependent  on  the  political  and  economic  conditions  and  how those  specific
conditions have been perceived by social actors. For example, when a nation’s economy
first starts into a downturn, supporters of laissez-faire are often successful in demanding a
rollback  of  previous  reforms  that  they  claimed  discouraged  productive  investment.
However,  if  the downturn continues,  the protective counter movement tends to gain
greater political leverage as more citizens demand protection from economic hardship. 
16 In  these  battles,  ideology  is  an  essential  resource.  Polanyi  drew  heavily  on  Marx’s
argument that revolutionary classes are able to exert greater influence when they claim
to be fighting for interests that are universal rather than just for their own particular
interests. This is precisely why the theory of self-regulating markets looms so large in
Polanyi’s analysis. If the movement for laissez-faire simply argued that expanding markets
would create more profit opportunities for certain firms, their arguments would have
little resonance. But invoking the theory of self-regulating markets developed by Malthus
and  Ricardo  is  an  effort  to  capitalize  on  a  broadly  shared interest  in  a  prosperous
economy and in protection from the intrusive exercise of state power. 
17 Moreover, ideology also conditions how political and economic events are understood. In
one  famous  passage,  Polanyi  notes  how political  leaders  in  the  aftermath  of  WW I,
including even the Bolsheviks, could see no alternative to the restoration of the pre-war
Gold Standard (Polanyi 2001, p. 26). This ideologically produced blindness led directly to
the global economic crisis of the 1930’s. Ultimately, the severity of the Great Depression
lifted the ideological blinders, and in the last years of W.W. II, the world’s political leaders
were able to agree on a new global monetary system that fixed many of the weaknesses of
the Gold Standard.
18 In  short,  the  global  context,  the  contradictory  pressures  on  the  state,  and  the
mobilization  of  ideology  represent  the  context  in  which  the  two  movements
contend. Who then are the actors who participate in these movements ? Capitalists and
workers are certainly key actors in Polanyi’s  account of  the double movement ;  they
represent respectively the durable core of the two competing movements. However, they
are certainly not the only actors in his analysis. Other social groups including landed
classes, shopkeepers, intellectuals, government officials, and groups with no shared class
identity routinely play key roles as part  of  these broad coalitions.  As with Gramsci’s
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concept  of  the  “historical  bloc”  (Burawoy  2003),  Polanyi  also  believed  that  the
bourgeoisie  and proletariat  exercised the  most  influence when they forged powerful
coalitions that included other social groups. 
19 But Polanyi also followed Weber in recognizing that in actual politics, classes often divide
along multiple lines including divisions between export-oriented industrialists and those
producing for the domestic market or between unskilled workers of one ethnic group and
skilled workers of another. So while capitalists tended to participate in the movement for
laissez-faire and workers in protective counter movements, things do not always line up so
neatly. There are always some capitalists who are fighting for protection from the market
and frequently  there are  groups of  workers  who ally  with the movement to expand
markets. 
20 While Polanyi often describes the two broad movements as political coalitions mobilized
around a particular goal, he also recognized that unity could not be assumed. Profound
differences over strategy or goals can, at times, make joint action impossible. Polanyi
does not explore this option, but there are time that the movement for laissez-faire is
hopelessly divided between free market extremists and more pragmatic defenders of the
market, and the two groups are weakened because they cannot make common cause.
Moreover, advocates for social protection can have radically different political agendas,
as in the 1930’s when both socialists and fascists offered critiques of market ideology but
proposed divergent strategies for protecting society from the market.
21 A similar situation exists in the contemporary world as protests and resistance to the
impacts of global forces have strengthened both activist movements of the political left
and various forms of religious and ethnic fundamentalism that are often reactionary in
their political preferences. These two very different types of movements compete to win
support from some of the same social groups and their relative strength will depend on
some combination of specifically local factors and political skill.
 
Opportunity, power, and capacity 
22 In its specifics, the double movement is a theory of politics in societies that are at least
nominally democratic and where citizens have a set of basic political rights. To be sure,
some of the analysis is also relevant to social struggles that occur under authoritarian
regimes. But the sheer difficulty of political mobilization under authoritarian conditions
makes it a separate topic. The double movement is about the normal politics of market
societies  with  democratic  governance,  where  adherents  of  both  laissez-faire  and  the
protective counter movement are able to press their case in the political arena. (Silver
and Arrighi 2003 make the point that there is no double movement in colonized societies
because of the effectiveness of repression.) 
23 Understanding the power and capacities of the laissez-faire side of the double movement
provides relatively few challenges. Most often, it is capitalists or wealth holders who are
in the vanguard of efforts to press for the expansion of markets and for the dismantling
of  barriers  that  restrict  their  ability  to  increase  profits. But  they  are  often  able  to
mobilize  a  broader  political  coalition that  agitates  for  expanded  markets.  Political
leaders, for example, might join because they recognize possibilities for economic growth
that could come from dismantling local or national barriers to the movement of goods or
capital,  and they  are  sometimes  able  to  build  cross-class  coalitions  in  favor  of  such
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policies. But in such fights, one will usually find some capitalists on both sides of the
divide. For example, “deregulatory” initiatives that open up some spheres of economic
activity to new competitors are likely to be resisted by some of the incumbent firms that
have flourished behind the regulatory barriers.
24 The proponents of laissez-faire usually justify their favored policies by invoking the vision
of a self-regulating market system in which the role of government is kept to a minimum
so that market signals are able to determine the allocation of land, labor, and capital.
However, many of those who advocate this self-regulating market system recognize their
own  dependence  on  the  continuous  and  widespread  exercise  of  the  state’s  coercive
powers to protect their property, control workers and the poor, and manage the market
system itself (Block 2003, Evans 2008). 
25 This is precisely why Polanyi termed the vision of a self-regulating market system to be
utopian ;  it  is  literally  impossible.  Without  the  state’s  continuous  management  on  a
variety of fronts, the market economy would collapse. In brief, the free market utopia
empowers the movement of laissez-faire by grounding their self-interested arguments in
an  appealing  and  seemingly  coherent  vision  of  a  desirable  social  order.  But  this
empowerment  is  not  unlimited ;  it  also  comes  with  a  measure  of  vulnerability.  The
fundamental incoherence of the free market utopia, and the day-to-day dependence of
wealth holders on the state, ultimately provides an ideological opening, an opportunity,
to the advocates of the protective counter movement.
26 A contemporary example should suffice to illustrate the opportunity that is available to
protective counter movements. Global corporations have waged fierce battles in recent
years for an international trade regime that enforces their property rights around the
world.  They frame their  argument within the standard language of  market  freedom.
Pharmaceutical  firms  insist  that  they  invested  scarce  resources  in  developing  new
medications and it is only fair that they be able to profit from their discovery wherever
there is demand for that product. After all, recycling a share of those profits into new
discoveries will ultimately benefit all global consumers (Evans 2008, Klug 2008)
27 The problem, however, is that the protection of those property rights requires a series of
action  by  states.  First,  the  firm’s  home  government  must  grant  the  firm  a  patent,
essentially  a  monopoly over the production of  a  particular  product  for  a  given time
period.  Second,  that  home  government,  or  one  of  its  allies,  must  make  clear  to
governments in other parts of the world that they are determined to protect the firm’s
property rights overseas. Third, other governments must agree to enforce that patent
and  interdict  any  competitor’s  product  that  infringes  on  that  patent.  In  short,  the
property right is not self-enforcing ; it requires political action in multiple sites.
28 The dependence of  the  firm on state  action creates  opportunities  for  the  protective
counter movements that are sometimes able to challenge the priorities of the states that
are involved. Advocates are able to ask why states are choosing to put the protection of
the firm’s property rights above the protection of the health of human beings who will
die without access to those medications.  This is a powerful argument that ultimately
forced the United States to agree in the Doha Declaration that governments have the
right to override these intellectual property claims to respond to health emergencies. The
argument was also a factor in the decision of the Administration of George W. Bush to
expand significantly U.S. spending on the battle against HIV/AIDS in Africa. To be sure,
behind  the  scenes,  the  U.S.  has  continued  to  discourage  the  flow  of  cheap  generic
antiviral drugs to Africa (Klug 2008). So that while the movements have had a real impact,
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they have not yet been able to mobilize enough pressure to force deeper institutional
changes. 
 
Exercising Power
29 The fact that the protective counter movement is consistently provided with ideological
openings hardly ensures that it will be able to exercise the power necessary to win the
protections  from  market  forces  that  it  seeks.  By  definition,  the  people  who  need
protection  the  most  are  those  with  the  fewest  material  resources,  and  this  lack  of
resources puts them at a structural disadvantage in the arena of politics. Wealth holders,
in contrast, are able to use ideological, structural, and instrumental power to advance the
agenda of laissez-faire and resist movements of social protection (Lukes 1974). They use
those  forms  of  power  to  structure  the  “rules  of  the  game”  to  assure  the  political
ineffectiveness or powerlessness of their opponents.
30 But  this  is  not  the  end  of  the  story.  Recently,  Frances  Fox  Piven  (2006,  2008)  has
developed  an  argument  about  “interdependent  power”  that  explains  how protective
counter  movements  are  sometimes  able  to  wield  considerable  influence  and  win
significant concessions. Piven starts from Marx’s insight that the structural position of
workers in production gives them power when they collectively withhold labor or refuse
to obey managerial commands. But she then argues that in the complex division of labor
and spatial organization of industrial and postindustrial societies, many different groups
have the opportunity to exercise interdependent power by collectively refusing to follow
the standard institutional  routines.  So,  for example,  the urban poor can assemble to
protest high food prices and refuse to disperse when ordered to do so by the police,
students can strike or occupy buildings, and activists can mobilize thousands to close
down highways, bridges, or other critical transportation linkages.
31 Piven recognizes that people are unlikely to engage in this form of disruptive protest
casually ;  the  threat  of  arrest  and  legal  sanctions  is  usually  sufficient  to  discourage
disruptive  protests.  However,  such  actions  become  more  likely  when  there  is  an
ideological opening that makes a particular injustice appear to be remediable through
political action and when there are significant obstacles to a purely repressive response
by the state. Such circumstances occur most often when political and economic elites are
seriously divided over how to solve the problems that the political system is facing. 
32  When elites are divided between a reformist wing and a conservative wing, there is an
increase in the opportunity for this exercise of interdependent power. The very existence
of the reformist wing helps to legitimate the claims of the insurgents that change is
possible and feasible. If the reformist wing is holding power, its leaders are considerably
less likely to unleash undifferentiated repression against the protestors. And when the
conservative wing is holding power, there is a chance that its use of repression will create
a backlash that brings the reformers into power. 
33 Moreover, movements can work to create the very circumstances in which the exercise of
disruptive power becomes feasible. Years of agitation using less dangerous tactics can
build up popular support and undermine the earlier unity among elites. In that sense, the
disruptive  actions  are  often the  culmination  of  many  years  of  preparation  including
earlier defeats and false starts.
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34 In  a  word,  movements  cannot  simply  will  the  existence  of  favorable  political
opportunities, but they are also not condemned to wait passively for such opportunities
to arise.
 
Capacity
35 But how is it that those with less power are able to exercise the solidarity that is needed
for the exercise of interdependent power? Those who most need protection from the
market are often separated from each other by religious, ethnic, racial, gender, age or
other  divisions.  How can they overcome these divisions and engage in joint  action ?
Moreover, if they engage in the rational calculus proposed by Mancur Olson (1971), they
would immediately recognize that it is to their advantage to “free ride” on the protest
activities of their neighbors or co-workers and only a handful of ideologically inclined
militants  would  actually  risk  reprisals  for  engaging  in  disruptive  actions.  Olson’s
argument cannot be easily dismissed since the calculus that he proposes perfectly mirrors
the prevailing ideology of the society–that individuals need to look out primarily for
themselves and that concern for others is an utterly impractical luxury in a dangerous
and competitive world.
36 The problem of explaining solidarity has plagued social theory long before Durkheim
made it the central category in The Division of Labor (1997 [1893]). As Viviana Zelizer (1985,
1988) has argued, the fear that the instrumental values of market society would erode the
ability of individuals to form durable bonds with others has been a theme in the culture
for hundreds of years. It was expressed by Shakespeare, theorized by the young Marx,
elaborated  by  Georg  Simmel,  and  remains  an  enduring  current  of  contemporary
theorizing (Hochschild 2003). However, analysts have been hard pressed to make the case
that this decline of fellow feeling and solidarity has actually occurred ; it is almost always
discussed as something that is  just about to happen–often suggested by the analyst’s
perception of the extreme cynicism and amorality of the young. 
37 Zelizer’s  contribution (1985,  2007) has been to argue thatthese instrumental,  market-
oriented values are continually being contested by other values, and that individuals are
able to draw on multiple cultural currents to avoid becoming the rational maximizers of
economic theory. However, she does not offer an explanation of where these alternative
values come from and how they are continually reproduced. But it is possible to extract
from  Polanyi’s  discussion  of  reciprocity,  which  draws  heavily  on  Durkheim  and
Mauss (1990 [1924]), the elements of such a general explanation.
38 In  The  Great  Transformation,  Polanyi  discusses  reciprocity  when  he  argues  that : “The
outstanding discovery of  recent historical  and anthropological  research is  that man’s
economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships.” (Polanyi 2001, p. 48) For
him, reciprocity and redistribution are general principles of behavior that have helped to
structure economic systems. He writes :
39 ...the orderly production and distribution of goods was secured through a great varietyof
individual motives disciplined by general principles of behavior. Among these motives
gain was not prominent. Custom and law, magic and religion cooperated in inducing the
individual to comply with rules of behavior which, eventually, ensured his functioning in
the economic system.” (Polanyi 2001, p. 57.)
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40 Polanyi is talking about something which is different from the thin notion of reciprocity
that occurs in market exchange. The thin model defines reciprocity as an exchange of
equivalents between two individuals where there is an expectation that the balancing will
occur relatively quickly. This model encompasses the circumstance where A does a favor
for B and assumes that B will return the favor relatively soon. This type of reciprocity is
consistent with the motive of gain since the parties are able to do a relatively precise
cost-benefit analysis to make sure that they will gain materially from the exchange.
41 Thick reciprocity is different in three important ways.2 First, there is no expectation of
exact equivalence ; what is given obligates the receiver, but how this obligation is to be
filled is open ended. Second, the relationships are not strictly dyadic ; what is received
from one person might obligate the receiver to give to one or multiple other people.
Finally, the timing of the obligation is also open-ended ; it might take many years for the
obligations of thick reciprocity to be redeemed.
42 As Mauss (1990) argues, thick reciprocity is hardly confined to primitive or historical
societies ;  it  remains a powerful force in modern societies (See, also, Hyde 1983). It is
currently most evident when longstanding relationships with lovers, friends, or relatives
are ended. Very often, one of the parties will explain the decision to end the relationship
by the other’s failure to meet the expectations of thick reciprocity. The vernacular is that
the other person was not “there for me” when I needed care, attention, or help even
though I had provided those for him or her under difficult circumstances. Such imperiled
relationships can sometimes be saved if the person who violated the expectations is able
to explain that  there were special  circumstances  that  made them unable to respond
appropriately. Such apologies are sometimes effective precisely because thick reciprocity
does not demand an immediate balancing of accounts. 
43 Most  people  learn how to  do  thick  reciprocity  beginning  in  childhood.3 The  nurture
and care of infants and small children by parents or other adults provides the model of an
unselfish relationship in which the child’s open ended obligation is simply to love and
obey the care giver. The child is supposed to understand that he or she will have the
opportunity to repay in the distant future either by caring for the aging parent or by
providing care for the next generation. Similar lessons are learned as the child forms
relationships  with  peers  and  comes  to  understand  the  norms  of  friendship,  and
ultimately of intimate relationships. While many of those early relationships might be
characterized by betrayals and disappointments, they still teach the basic expectations of
thick reciprocity. Moreover, the same lessons are reinforced by both religious and secular
authorities who remind us that we should treat others as we wish to be treated ourselves. 
44 This  nearly  universal  capacity  to  construct  relationships  based  on  norms  of  thick
reciprocity is the basic social material out of which protective counter movements can be
constructed.  People learn empathy,  the ability to take the role of  the other,  and the
demands of thick reciprocity in their personal relationships and they bring those skills
with them when they encounter strangers. These skills can be used to forge solidaristic
relationships  with  multiple  others  and  it  is  in  the  context  of  those  solidaristic
relationships  that  people  take  actions  that  could  never  be  justified  by  purely  self-
interested calculations. 
45 Moreover,  the  logic  of  solidarity  means  that  in  building  such  protective  counter
movements, it is not necessary that everyone is either similar or is responding to an
identical  threat.  Thick  reciprocity  makes  it  possible  to  create  broader  and  broader
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networks of solidarity that cross existing lines of social division. Even though we are of
different ethnicities or skill levels, I might be willing to rally today to support you against
your employer because I know that I might need such help against my own employer six
months or a year from now. Similarly when I recognize that environmental struggles and
labor struggles are connected, I might participate in both types of actions with equal
enthusiasm.4
 
Barriers
46 While this capacity for thick reciprocity and the building of solidaristic relationships is a
constantly renewing feature of social  life,  actual participation in social  movements is
highly variable over time. Even in the face of the most severe challenges, it cannot be
assumed that strong counter movements will appear. The most striking recent example
was the response to “shock therapy” in various parts of what had been the Communist
bloc.  In Russia and other former socialist  states,  newly chosen governments adopted
radical  programs of market-oriented reforms that produced very dramatic downward
shifts in living standards that persisted for years (Meurs and Ranasinghe 2003). While the
economic dislocation produced a range of adaptive behaviors including widespread resort
to barter and reliance even among urbanites on their own garden plots, there was often
little in the way of protest or social movement activity (Burawoy , Krotov, and Lytinka
2000, Woodruff 1999)
47 The example suggests the importance of the way events are framed ideologically. Free
market  ideas  had played a  central  role  in  the delegitimation of  Soviet-style  regimes
through  the  1970’s  and  1980’s ;  most  key  dissidents  embraced  these  ideas  without
reservation. So when the pursuit of a rapid transition to the market produced widespread
economic and social dislocation, most people were left with a very limited repertoire of
explanation.  One option was to take the proponents of  laissez-faire  at their word and
accept  that  there  was  no  immediate  alternative  to  austerity  and  that  things  would
eventually get better. The other was to listen to the defenders of the Soviet regime and
argue for its restoration. But given the glaring defects of that regime, few people were
willing to mobilize around the slogan of socialist restoration. 
48 While  the  recent  history  of  the  United  States  is  very  different,  it  also  suggests  the
importance of  ideology in explaining the relative weakness of  the protective counter
movement. Starting in the late 1970’s, the movement for laissez-faire in the U.S. moved
from  triumph  to  triumph.  It  made  the  tax  system  substantially  more  regressive,  it
dismantled a significant part of the system for regulating business and finance, it cut back
social programs designed to protect the poor and the weak, and it aggressively pushed
“free trade” and “free markets” abroad (Block 2007, Harvey 2005). Yet even though these
policies had adverse consequences for the prosperity of the average citizen (Bartels 2008)
, it took until the Democrats made gains in the 2006 midterm elections before one could
plausibly speak of a protective counter movement that was strong enough to impact state
policies. 
49 Three factors help account for how long it took before the protective counter movement
could make a significant challenge in the U.S. The first was the extraordinary investment
from the mid-1970’s onward by business leaders and conservatives in the propagation of
free  market  ideas  through  think  tanks,  policy  organizations,  contributions  to  both
political parties, and the mass media (Block 2007, Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004).
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Alternative  framings  that  suggested  that  their  might  be  limits  to  the  market  were
literally drowned out. The second was a high level of elite unity around these ideas that
persisted until the election of George W. Bush in 2000. While the Clinton Administration
initially made some challenges to market-oriented policies,  it  ultimately accepted the
logic  of  greater  reliance  on  the  market  at  home  and  abroad  (Shoch  2008).  Counter
movements  were  able  to  grow,  as  reflected  in  the  mobilizations  against  NAFTA and
against the WTO in Seattle in 1999, but their political impact was limited.
50 Finally,  part  of  the protective counter movement in the U.S.  was channeled into the
activism of the religious right that worked to strengthen the conservative movement’s
influence at the national level. One important current in the grassroots activism of the
religious right in the 1980’s and 1990’s was a sense of economic dislocation caused by
plant closings, corporate downsizing, and increasing economic insecurity (Block 2007).
But as more people sought comfort and support in evangelical congregations, they were
mobilized on behalf of “Christian values” to support conservative politicians committed
to the project of laissez-faire (Frank 2004).
51  Beyond the double movement ?
52 When he wrote The Great Transformation, Polanyi anticipated that the era of the double
movement might finally have ended since much of the world had come to recognize the
folly of organizing human society around self-regulating markets. He imagined a new era
in which humanity collectively chose to subordinate markets to political control. Bretton
Woods and the system of “embedded liberalism” did represent a sharp break with the
logic  of  the  Gold  Standard,  but  we  now  know  that  the  break  proved  to  be  only
temporary. In the 1970’s, the global rules of the game shifted sharply in the direction of
market sovereignty and the theorists of self-regulating markets suddenly regained the
influence that they had lost in the 1930’s and 1940’s. Friedrich Hayek, one of Polanyi’s
antagonists in theoretical debates in Vienna in the 1920’s, survived to become the favored
theorist of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. 
53 But despite Polanyi’s failure as a prophet, the question remain open. Is humanity doomed
to endless cycles in which one movement is in the ascendancy followed by the other ? Or
is it possible that the age of the double movement could finally be transcended ? If so,
how would this transcendence occur and what would it look like ? Some answers are
suggested by Polanyi’s discussion of the “reality of society” in the final pages of The Great
Transformation.
54 Polanyi  wrote :  “Man [sic]  becomes mature and able  to exist  as  a  human being in a
complex society.” This reflects his belief  that human beings are fundamentally social
beings  who  can  realize  their  full  potential  only  in  a  complex  society  with  a  highly
developed division of labor, high levels of individual autonomy, and a state that exercises
a Weberian monopoly over the means of compulsion. Polanyi believed that institutional
procedures and rights could be established that  would effectively prevent the state’s
coercive power from being used in ways that were illegitimate or designed to preserve
the position of particular individuals or interests. However, he was quite insistent that :
55  “Power  and  compulsion  are  a  part  of  that  reality ;  an  ideal  that  would  ban  them
from society must be invalid.” (p. 267)
56 However, he also recognized that the fear of power and compulsion were deeply rooted in
Western traditions and had created utopian visions of a society in which the power of the
state either withered away or was limited to the role of a night watchman. He traced
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these fears back to the Christian Gospels that had preached a vision of each individual
exercising his or her own freedom of conscience autonomously from everyone else. The
Gospels, in short, did not recognize the “reality of society”, that people necessarily live
together in complex interdependence. For Polanyi,  the Gospels were the source of an
obsolete  paradigm in  which individual  freedom could only  be  guaranteed under  the
completely  unrealistic  condition  that power  and  compulsion  were  eliminated  from
society.
57 Polanyi believed that humanity’s maturation required a new paradigm that recognized
that the ethical injunctions of the Gospels could only be realized by surrendering to the
reality of life in a complex society. He briefly outlined this new paradigm in the final
pages of The Great Transformation, that durable change required both a new paradigm of
human freedom and new institutional forms that would support that paradigm. At the
global  level,  this  meant  a  new set  of  international  institutions  to  manage trade and
financial flows. He favored something along the lines of John Maynard Keynes’ proposal
for  an International  Clearing Union so that  every nation could pursue high levels  of
employment and protect its citizens from global market forces (Skidelsky 2000). 
58 The suggestion is that with both a change in human consciousness and a change in global
institutions,  the  double  movement  would finally  come to  an end. The new paradigm
would assure that people no longer defined human freedom in terms of being left alone
and this would immediately deprive laissez-faire rhetoric of its core appeal. At the same
time, there would no longer be a global hegemon pressing other nations to adopt the
template of market self-regulation. Groups within nations might well argue for greater
reliance on markets in particular policy areas, but such arguments would likely be tested
pragmatically rather than being granted some kind of epistemological privilege (Somers
and Block 2005). 
59 In  short,  there  would  continue  to  be  a  process  of  experimentation  where  different
societies increased or decreased the role of markets, but the shifts would be less dramatic
and less ideologically charged than in the era of the double movement. Such shifts would
occur within a broad consensus that an effective society and economy required markets,
government regulation, and mediating social institutions. This would provide societies
with considerable freedom to develop social institutions that produced greater prosperity
and greater equality while also being environmentally sustainable. 
60 Despite Polanyi’s hopes, this kind of durable transition did not occur in the 1940’s. The
influence of the social sciences expanded in the immediate post-World War II period, but
this fell well short of the paradigm shift that Polanyi anticipated. The Bretton Woods
institutions  did  allow  for  a  period  of  “embedded  liberalism”  in  which  nations  had
considerable opportunity to buffer their economies from the global market. But when the
Bretton Woods system entered into crisis at the end of the 1960’s, the decision was made
to shift to a system of floating exchange rates which significantly strengthened global
market forces. Moreover, in the aftermath of the social conflicts of the 1960’s and the
economic troubles of the early 1970’s,  the free market utopia gained millions of new
acolytes and the U.S. redoubled its efforts to press the market template on other nations.
History was again fully in the grip of the double movement. 
61 However, Polanyi’s theoretical framework helps to explain his own failure as a prophet. 
62 In the U.S., the economic dynamism of the 1960’s and 1970’s was similar to the period of
intense  economic  change  in  England  at  the  beginning of  the  19th  century.  Stronger
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economic  linkages  and  a  deepening  division  of  labor  dramatically  increased  social
interdependence.  More  people  were  working  in  large  organizations  and  also  had  to
recognize that their livelihoods and prosperity were increasingly dependent on events
and people on the other side of the world. Without the paradigm shift that Polanyi had
hoped for, this intensified interdependence was widely perceived as a threat to individual
autonomy (Block, forthcoming).
63 Just as in the early 19th century, it became appealing for many to seek to protest and
oppose this oppressive “reality of society” by embracing the utopia of self-regulating
markets.  The  right  wing  was  particularly  effective  in  mobilizing  such  sentiments  in
collective efforts such as the anti-tax mobilizations of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. The
paradox is  that  at  a  time when most  people’s  work had become highly abstract  and
collaborative, an anti-tax rhetoric that was rooted in an early 19th century society of
autonomous farmers and artisans gained extraordinary resonance. Anti-tax and other
movements against oppressive government ushered in an almost thirty year period of
right wing dominance organized around anti-government and pro-market rhetoric. 
64 However, the time might again be ripe for the new paradigm that Polanyi anticipated.
Two indicators are particularly important. First, the problems of the global environment
including climate change,  the deteriorating condition of  the world’s  oceans,  and the
difficulty of feeding almost 7 billion people seriously challenge the old concept of human
freedom.  How  can  one  defend  an  individual’s  right  to  waste  resources  or  foul  the
environment when it puts the survival of others at risk ? Second, a new generation has
grown up that sees the technologies of communication and connectivity not as a threat
but as a tool for building stronger ties of community and solidarity. Younger people do
not appear to share their parents fears or ambivalence about a greater degree of social
interdependence ; they simply take it as a given. 
65 These changes could mean that today’s protective counter movement has the possibility
not only of protecting societies and the planet from the grave dangers posed by global
markets,  but  of  finally  ending  the  double  movement  itself.  However,  such  a  radical
transformation would require social mobilization on a global scale, the creation of new
global institutions, and the elaboration of a new paradigm for conceptualizing individual
freedom in a complex society.
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NOTES
1.  This essay builds on Block (2000), Block (2003), Block (2007), Block (forthcoming) and Somers
and Block (2005).
2.  The distinction between thin and thick or weak and strong reciprocity is also developed by
others. See, for example Gintis and Khurana 2008.
3.  Obviously,  this  learning  is  not  universal,  but  those  who  fail  usually  are  labeled  as
developmentally disabled or as sociopaths.
4.  For a discussion of how a social movement can self-consciously build such commonality across
social divides, see De Sousa Santos 2008.
ABSTRACTS
Karl  Polanyi  argued in The Great  Transformation  (2001 [1944])that  the development of  market
societies over the past two hundred years has been shaped by a double movement. On one side is
the movement of laissez faire--the efforts by a variety of groups to expand the scope and influence
of  self-regulating  markets. On  the  other  side  has  been  the  movement  of  protection–the
initiatives, again by a wide range of social actors, to insulate the fabric of social life from the
destructive impact of market pressures. The essay starts by laying out the broad outlines of the
double movement idea, and then it elaborates the micro-foundations of the protective counter
movement to explain how agents sometimes have the opportunity, the power, and the capacity
to challenge and change the institutional structures of market societies. After examining barriers
to the mobilization of a protective counter movement, the final section explores the possibilities
of moving beyond the double movement.
Karl Polanyi est bien connu pour son livre The Great Transformation (2001 [1944], où il soutient que
les économies capitalistes ont été l’objet d’un double mouvement. D’un côté, le laissez-faire, et de
l’autre des mesures protectionnistes pour protéger la vie sociale de l’impact destructeur des du
marché. Cet essai commence par décrire ce double mouvement, élabore les micro-fondations du
mouvement protectionniste afin d’expliquer comment les  agents  ont  parfois  la  possibilité,  le
pouvoir et la capacité de défier et de modifier les structures des sociétés marchandes. Après avoir
traité  des  barrières  à  la  mobilisation  de  ce  mouvement  protectionniste,  la  dernière  section
explore les possibilités d’aller au delà de ce double mouvement.
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